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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS, : 
Cross-petitioner, : 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : Case No. 900471 
Priority No. 13 
Cross-respondent. : 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the prosecutor violate the plea agreement, entitling 
Mr. Pharris to withdrawal of the plea? 
2. Did the trial court violate standards of judicial 
neutrality in reimposing the withdrawn guilty plea on the day of 
trial? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Mr. Pharris' withdrawal of the reimposed plea? 
4. Did the trial court rely on material misinformation in 
sentencing Mr. Pharris? 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals7 decision, State v. Pharris, 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is included in Appendix 1 to this 
brief. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals' opinion was filed on September 14, 
1990. No petition for rehearing was filed. The State's petition 
for certiorari was filed on October 15, 1990. This Court's 
jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Pharris entered a plea of guilty to retail theft, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-602(1), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, 
presiding (T. 5). After sentencing, the trial court allowed 
Mr. Pharris to withdraw the plea, but then reimposed the plea on the 
day of trial (T. 11-12). Defense counsel moved to withdraw the 
reimposed plea, and the trial court denied the motion and reimposed 
the sentence (T. 20). 
While the original plea agreement bound the prosecutor from 
opposing Mr. Pharris' motion for a lesser sentence (T. 2), the 
prosecutor twice summarized Mr. Pharris' criminal record, which was 
already before the court in the pleadings file (T. 7-8, 17; R. 9-14). 
Although there was no evidence that the offense alleged was 
drug related, the trial court's comments during the sentencing 
hearing indicate that the trial court thought the offense was drug 
related. 
Mr. Pharris appealed the conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, raising several issues. The Court of Appeals 
reversed Mr. Pharris' conviction, reaching only the issue relating 
to the trial court's failure to comply with Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 in accepting Mr. Pharris' guilty plea. Pharris at 35. 
Noting that during the entry of the guilty plea, the trial court had 
- 2 -
failed to review on the record three of the Rule 11 requirements 
(waiver of right against self-incrimination, understanding of nature 
and elements of offense, knowledge of potential punishment), the 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for withdrawal 
of the plea. Id. at 37-38. 
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, 
attacking the Court of Appeals' analysis of the issue reached by the 
court. 
Mr. Pharris opposes the State's petition for a writ of 
certiorari, and presents this conditional cross-petition solely to 
preserve the issues not reached by the Court of Appeals, which will 
be pertinent to his appeal in the event that this Court grants the 
State's petition for a writ.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relating to Mr. Pharris' conviction are 
adequately presented in the Court of Appeals' decision. 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
REASONS FOR GRANTING MR. PHARRIS' CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION 
Mr. Pharris does not contend that the issues raised in this 
conditional cross-petition fall within any of the circumstances 
justifying a writ listed in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46. 
1
 It is not clear that this conditional cross-petition is 
necessary to preserve Mr. Pharris' issues raised in but not reached 
by the Court of Appeals. See Stern, Gressman, and Shapiro, Supreme 
Court Practice (6th Edition) at 382-387 (under United States Supreme 
Court practice, the law is ambiguous as to when a cross-petition for 
certiorari is necessary); State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 
1985)(this Court may affirm the ruling of the lower court on any 
proper ground). 
- 3 -
Mr. Pharris invokes this Court's broad common law powers to 
issue the writ,2 so that Mr. Pharris' entire case is preserved for 
consideration in the event this Court grants the State's petition 
for a writ. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pharris requests that this Court grant his conditional 
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
in the event that this Court grants the State's petition for a 
writ. 
Respectfully submitted this 3&tL day of October, 1990. 
JAMEfS A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Mr. Pharris 
. Pharris 
2
 This Court's common law powers to issue the writ are 
recognized in Article VIII section 3 of the Utah Constitution, and 
explained in Boaaess v. Morris. 635 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Utah 1981). 
- 4 -
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
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- 5 -
APPENDIX 1 
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
i<o uian Adv. Kep. 35 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JTATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
rank Edward PHARRIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Jo. 890549-CA 
ILED: September 14, 1990 
hird District, Salt Lake County 
he Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
TTORNEYS: 
imes A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
sfore Judges Billings, Jackson, and Newey.1 
[LLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Frank Edward Pharris appeals 
s conviction of retail theft, a third degree 
lony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
502(1) (1989). We vacate the conviction 
d remand. 
Defendant was accused of taking a VCR 
>m a Sears store without paying for it. 
•lice arrested defendant in the store parking 
with the VCR in his possession. 
Defendant's trial was set for August 8, 
S9. On the day of trial, defendant agreed to 
er a guilty plea if the State would not 
pose a motion that defendant be sentenced 
rsuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
i(l)(c) (1989), for a class A misdemeanor. 
Kt the change of plea hearing, the trial 
ge asked defendant whether he had gone 
T his statement with his attorney, whether 
was under the influence of drugs or 
3hol, whether he understood the English 
guage, whether he was threatened or pro-
ed anything other than the plea bargain 
If, and whether he was acting freely and of 
own volition. 
'he judge then told defendant he was enti-
to certain constitutional protections incl-
ig the right to trial by a jury, the right to 
front and cross-examine witnesses, the 
t to require the State to prove its case 
Dnd a reasonable doubt, and "other valu-
constitutional rights." Defendant said he 
erstood his waiver of those rights by ple-
g guilty and was willing to do so. 
lie judge asked defendant if he had any 
.tions of the court or of his attorney. 
mdant responded, "No." The judge asked 
fendant knew the allrvwaKip npnoitior f~- ~ 
ndant answered, "Yes." The judge told defe-
ndant the court was not bound by the reco-
mmendations of the plea bargain and the 
court could impose any sentence either conc-
urrently or consecutively with the sentence 
defendant was presently serving. 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty which the 
judge declared was entered voluntarily and 
knowingly. Defendant waived the two-day 
minimum time for sentencing and asked to be 
sentenced immediately. Defense counsel asked 
the court to impose sentence as a class A 
misdemeanor. The prosecutor did not oppose 
defense counsel's request but described defe-
ndant's extensive criminal record. The judge 
denied defendant's motion to reduce the 
offense one degree and sentenced defendant to 
serve zero to five years concurrently with the 
sentence he was presently serving. 
Defendant immediately moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea and asked to proceed to trial. 
Defense counsel , argued that unless his client 
received some concession in the sentence, it 
would be a disservice to him not to go to trial. 
The judge granted the motion and set trial for 
the next day. 
The next morning, the judge reversed his 
decision granting the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, explaining that a showing of 
"good cause" was required. The judge then 
gave defendant an opportunity to show good 
cause as to why his plea should be withdrawn. 
In response, defense counsel explained the 
State had not opposed the reduction of defe-
ndant's sentence to a class A misdemeanor. 
He pointed to the length of time defendant 
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the 
circumstances surrounding defendant's release 
on another conviction and his subsequent 
arrest. Defense counsel also mentioned that he 
had ineffectively represented defendant by 
indicating that the plea baigain had a good 
chance of success. In response, the prosecutor 
again outlined portions of defendant's prior 
criminal record. 
The judge noted he had informed defendant 
before the guilty plea was entered that the 
recommendations as to the sentence were not 
binding on the court and defendant's disap-
pointment with the sentence did not establish 
good cause for withdrawal of the plea. The 
judge ultimately reimposed the sentence. 
Among other claims on appeal,2 defendant 
asserts the trial judge failed to comply with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proc-
edure as required by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), when accepting his guilty plea. Defen-
dant contends the trial court failed to inform 
him of (1) his r ight aga ins t self-
incrimination; (2) the nature and elements of 
the offense: and n^ th*> nncci'hi** r^«oi*;~« 
does not contend the trial court's questioning 
of defendant complies with the Gibbons strict 
compliance test, but rather responds that 
appellate court decisions subsequent to Gibbons 
have abandoned the strict compliance 
standard and allow application of the prior 
"record as a whole" test to determine whether 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered 
his guilty plea. The State further asserts that, 
at the hearing before the trial judge, defendant 
did not articulate as a ground for withdrawal 
of his plea that the court failed to comply with 
Rule 11 and thus defendant cannot raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
CONSIDERING VOLUNTARINESS OF 
GUILTY PLEA FOR FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 
challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be 
considered for the first time on appeal. "[I]n 
certain cases we may consider the failure to 
comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error 
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be 
first raised on appeal to this court." State v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam).3 See also State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (defendant 
had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and 
court remanded to the trial court to allow a 
withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction 
over the case). 
The Valencia court relied on the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the 
Court found no error when the Alabama 
Supreme Court, on its own motion, dealt with 
the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Id. at 
240. The Court stated that "[i]t was error, 
plain on the face of the record, for the trial 
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without 
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent 
and voluntary. Id. at 242.4 
"'Although we acknowledge that the trial 
judge made a greater effort to ensure that 
defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowi-
ngly given than in Valencia and Boykin; 
because of the fundamental rights involved, 
we conclude the trial court's deficiencies in 
determining whether the guilty plea was 
entered knowingly and voluntarily constitute 
plain error.5 We therefore will address this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
RULE 11 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure sets out findings a court must make 
before accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(5) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty or no contest, and 
— -• —+ •!•»/* *>loo u n t i l t h e 
(0) tne p i e a IS VUlUiuaia; uiHuv, 
(c) the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elem-
ents; 
(e) the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sent-
ences; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). 
Prior to 1987, the Utah Supreme Court did 
not require strict compliance with Rule 11. 
The court had concluded that a guilty plea 
may be upheld if "the record as a whole affi-
rmatively establishes that defendant entered 
his plea with full knowledge and understan-
ding of its consequences." Warner v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) (mem.); see also 
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). This "record as a 
whole" test was later reaffirmed in State v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam). 
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
the "record as a whole" test. In State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court announced that strict compli-
ance was required under Rule 11(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when def-
endants entered guilty pleas. Id. at 1314. In Gib-
bons, the trial judge, in accepting 
Gibbons' guilty plea, informed him of the 
penalties for the crimes, the constitutional 
rights he waived as articulated in Rule 11, the 
possible sentences for the crimes, and the 
possibility that those sentences could run 
concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 1311. 
However, the trial judge failed to inform 
Gibbons of the elements of the crimes. Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court remanded Gibbon's 
appeal of his guilty plea because he had not 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby 
depriving the trial court of the opportunity to 
address the error, but articulated its concern 
that the plea was not properly taken as defe-
ndant had not been adequately informed of 
the elements of the offense to which he pled. Id. 
w accepting guilty pleas. The court noted the 
"ial court's burden to comply with the Rule 
1 requirements: 
Because of the importance of 
compliance with Rule 11(e) [new 
Rule 11(5)] and Boykin, the law 
places the burden of establishing 
compliance with those requirements 
on the trial judge. It is not suffic-
ient to assume that defense attor-
neys make sure that their clients 
fully understand the contents of the 
affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit 
can promote efficiency, but- an 
affidavit should be only a starting 
point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process, 
at 1313. 
"he court found that a "sufficient affidavit * 
uld contain the following elements: (1) a 
of the names and the degrees of the crimes 
rged; (2) a statement of the elements of the 
mses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts 
establish the elements of the crimes 
rged; (4) the allowable punishment for the 
les charged and note the possibility of 
secutive sentences for multiple crimes; (5) 
rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea; 
he details of any plea bargain with a dis-
ner that any sentencing recommendations 
not be followed; (7) the defendant's 
ty to read and understand the English 
iiage; (8) the defendant's competency; and 
he absence of any inducements to influ-
defendant's plea. Id. at 1313-14. The 
I concluded that " [t]he trial judge should 
review the statements in the affidavit with 
iefendant, question the defendant conce-
his understanding of it, and fulfill the 
requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on 
'cord before accepting the guilty plea." Id. 
4 (emphasis added). 
* Gibbons standard was acknowledged by 
ourt in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
Itah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 
1278 (Utah 1988), where we reiterated 
le that: 
]rial courts may not rely on 
sfense counsel or executed affid-
/its to satisfy the specific require-
ents of Rule 11(e). [Gibbons, 740 
.2d] at 1313. Rather, with or 
ithout an affidavit or defense 
>unsel's advice, the trial court 
ust conduct an on-the-record 
view with defendant of the Rule 
(e) requirements. 
opulos, 756 P.2d at 94 (quoting Gib-
740 P.2d at 1314)). However, in 
opulos, the defendant's guilty plea was 
„ «,~ jpxwi^ ua ICUJJTU as a wnole" test. 
Recently in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we clearly held 
that the Gibbons strict compliance test is 
controlling. Id. at 28. 
Other opinions have likewise stated the test 
for determining whether Rule 11 has been 
followed is the strict compliance test articul-
ated in Gibbons. See State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 
464, 465 (Utah 1989)6; State v. Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per 
curiam)7. 
The State relies on Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
S. Ct. 751 (1990),* and State v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988),* to support its 
argument that the Utah Supreme Court has 
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test. 
However, we assume that the court applied the 
"record as a whole" test in these cases because 
the guilty pleas in both cases were entered 
before the Gibbons decision.10 
The State also argues that this court has 
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test as 
well in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). However, Thurston is not on 
point and the State is mistaken in its reliance 
on this case. In Thurston, the defendant 
argued the State had not kept its part of the 
plea agreement as to the recommendation that 
defendant receive probation and thus defen-
dant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea because of this failure. Id. at 1301. The 
issue was not whether the trial court failed to 
comply with Rule 11 in determining whether 
the plea was knowing and voluntary. As the 
court explained: 
The record here establishes that 
defendant was fully informed of his 
rights and the consequences of his 
guilty plea. 
The judge, pursuant to Rule 11, 
informed defendant of his rights to 
t r i a l a n d a g a i n s t s e l f -
incrimination, and related to him 
the potential consequences of his 
guilty plea. 
Id. at 1302. 
In summary, we find the Gibbons strict 
compliance test is applicable to this post-
Gibbons guilty plea. In reviewing the trial 
court's inquiry into the voluntariness of def-
endant's plea, we find the trial judge did not 
review with the defendant in court on the 
record three of the requirements of Rule 11. 
First, the trial court did not as required by 
Rule ll(5)(c) inform defendant at the time the 
plea was taken that he waived his constituti-
onal right against self-incrimination by ple-
ading guilty to the offense. The State argues 
that this information is included in the affid-
avit. However, inclusion in the affidavit alone 
Next, tne inai C U U l L lllClVlV AAV/ l i i u w . . ,
 v 
record concerning defendant's understanding 
of the nature and elements of the offense as 
required by Rule 1 l(5)(d). The State argues 
that the nature and elements of the offense of 
retail theft were explained at defendant's 
preliminary hearing. However, the preliminary 
hearing transcript is not before us and thus it 
is impossible for us to make this determina-
tion. Again, this information is only in the 
affidavit and, as we have explained, that alone 
is insufficient. Failure to inform a defendant 
of the nature and elements of the offense is 
fatal to a guilty plea conviction. See Gibbons, 
740 P.2d at 1314." See also Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Finally, the trial court failed to review the 
possible punishment with defendant as requ-
ired by Rule ll(5)(e). The record reflects the 
following dialogue between the defendant and 
the trial court on the issue of penalties: 
Q [THE COURT]: Are you aware of the 
possible penalties that can be imposed for a 
Third Degree Felony? Has your attorney told 
you what the possible penalties are? 
A [DEFENDANT]: Yes. 
Utah courts have found the failure to 
inform a defendant of the punishments poss-
ible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction.12 See 
Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (court 
reversed because record did not show defen-
dant was informed of the minimum manda-
tory sentence which would be imposed); Vas-
ilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95 (in a pic-Gibbons 
plea, the court reversed after finding the def-
endant did not understand the possibility of 
consecutive sentences).13 
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test, 
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court 
must review on the record with the defendant 
at the time the plea is taken the nature and 
elements of the offense, the constitutional 
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives 
by pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties. 
We find that the trial court failed to strictly 
"comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons and thus we 
vacate defendant's conviction and remand to 
the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Robert L. Newey, Judge 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (1990). 
2. Defendant also claims that (1) the prosecutor 
failed to comply with the plea agreement; (2) the 
court erred in reversing its prior order granting 
withdrawal of the plea; (3) there was "good cause" 
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea; and 
* .»_ —•«„„«
 WQC hased on material 
3. In Valencia, the defendant was aaKcu i«y
 M«™ 
ions at the time the guilty plea was entered: (1) 
whether defendant "understood his affidavit;" and 
(2) whether his plea was "voluntary." Valencia, 776 
P.2d at 1334. The court found that the guilty plea 
was not entered in compliance with Rule 11(5) or 
with Gibbons and summarily reversed and remanded 
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and 
proceed to trial. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334. 
4. In Boykin, there was no dialogue in the record 
between the defendant and the trial judge as to the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 
239, and the United States Supreme Court therefore 
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights 
had been violated. Id. at 243. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a two-
part test for determining plain error. State v. Eldr-
edge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
5. Ct. 62 (1989). First, the error must be "plain," 
which means "from our examination of the record, 
we must be able to say that it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing 
error." Id. at 35. Second, the error "must affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error 
be harmful." Id. See also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 
1336, 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was 
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. There-
fore, it should have been obvious to the trial judge 
that strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In 
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional 
rights were affected by this failure to strictly comply 
with Rule 11. 
6. In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial 
judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Smith, 
111 P.2d at 465. The court ruled that the test for 
complying with Rule 11 is the strict compliance test 
articulated in Gibbons. Id. The court then found 
that neither the plea bargain affidavit nor the trial 
judge clearly communicated that defendant would 
be required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence 
of five years. Id. 
7. In Valencia, the defendant entered his guilty plea 
after the Gibbons decision. The trial judge failed to 
review the contents of the affidavit with the defen-
dant. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. The court concl-
uded that the affidavit alone could not "serve as a 
mere substitute for the full and complete review on 
the record by the trial court that is required by the 
rule." Id. Since the trial judge failed to comply with 
Rule 11, the court remanded to the trial court to 
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. 
8. In J olivet, the Utah Supreme Court applied the 
"record as a whole" test to Jolivet's motion to wit-
hdraw a guilty plea. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149. 
While the court does not give the date Jolivet 
entered his guilty plea or address the fact that the 
guilty plea had been entered prior to Gibbons, the 
Jolivet decision was the second appeal by the defe-
ndant, who had entered his guilty plea prior to the 
first appeal decided in 1986, before the decision in 
Gibbons. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 
1986). 
9. In Copeland, the defendant argued that the trial 
court failed to explain the nature and elements of 
the offense. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. The court 
examined the record and found that the trial court 
had adequately explained the elements of the crime 
• « -J-— iA Aithrmoh the trial court did 
ise the preferred method of having the 
idant state in his own words his understanding 
* offense and the actions which make him 
of the crime," id., the court found that the 
Us of the offense were clearly explained to 
lant at the time of his arraignment and, ther-
under the "record as a whole" test, the plea 
)luntary. Id. Once again, however, Copeland 
i his guilty plea before Gibbons was decided 
though the court did not articulate this as a 
for applying the "record as a whole" test, we 
\ this to be the case. 
ah courts have refused to apply the Gibbons 
:ompliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. 
te v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
1988), this court ruled that the Gibbons test 
t apply since Vasilacopulos entered his guilty 
1984 before the Gibbons case was decided. Id. 
The court ruled that since the Gibbons 
is a "clear break with the past," it would not 
plied retroactively. Id. See also State v. 
an, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per 
). 
le Gibbons court relied on McCarthy v. 
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the 
States Supreme Court stated that the factual 
ts of the charges must be explained so the 
ant understands those elements. Id. at 466. 
ourt concluded that "[t]here is no adequate 
Jte for demonstrating in the record at the 
\e plea is entered the defendant's understan-
d s nature of the charge against him." Id. 
e State argues the affidavit is sufficient to 
' defendant of the allowable sentence, 
er, the affidavit signed by the defendant 
'Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" under the notation 
ime, Degree, and Punishment," but the affi-
id not include the term "years" following "0-
* Gibbons court stated that a judge may not 
affidavit to establish compliance with Rule 
is not sufficient to assume that 
fense attorneys make sure that their 
ents fully understand the contents of 
e affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can 
omote efficiency, but an affidavit 
ould be only a starting point, not an 
d point, in the pleading process. 
s,740P.2datl313. 
Utah Supreme Court's most recent opinion 
Gibbons issue is somewhat ambiguous. In 
Smith, 111 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), the court 
hat neither the affidavit nor the trial court 
explained the possibility of a minimum 
ory sentence to the defendant. Id. at 465. 
urt concluded: "In order for defendant's 
lea to be valid and in compliance with rule 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
te v. Gibbons, the record must show that he 
*quivocably and clearly informed about the 
) that would be imposed. Such evidence does 
n either in the affidavit regarding the plea 
or in the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus, 
e) and State v. Gibbons require the vacating 
idant's guilty plea on the ground that it was 
>winelv and voluntarily made." Id. at 466 
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PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appel-
lant's motion for summary reversal for man-
ifest error, pursuant to Utah R. App. P . 10. 
In response, appellee filed a motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs motion for summary disposition, 
but did not file a response addressing the 
merits of appellant's motion. 
We first consider appellee's motion to 
dismiss appellant's motion. Appellee contends 
that the motion was untimely based on Rule 
10's requirement that a motion for summary 
disposition be filed within 10 days after the 
docketing statement is served. Appellant's 
docketing statement was served on July 9, 
1990, and her motion for summary disposition 
was filed on July 23, 1990. Appellant contends 
that because she served the docketing state-
ment by mail, she was entitled to an additional 
three days after service of the docketing stat-
ement in which to file a motion for summary 
reversal. See Utah R. App. P. 22(d). Although 
this three-day mailing rule is usually applied 
when the receiving party is required or perm-
itted to act after receipt of the document, it 
does not specifically exclude the present situ-
ation. It is unnecessary to rely upon the 
mailing rule, however, since Utah R. App. P . 
2 provides this court with the flexibility to 
suspend the requirements of Rule 10, on its 
own motion, where asuspension is "[i]n the 
interest of expediting a decision." Because we 
conclude that the motion is clearly meritorious 
and would thus support a suspension of Rule 
